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Thirty adult undergraduates and graduate students were placed in one
of three quantitative information content groups.

The Ss received either

High, Medium or Low Information Content (IC) in a concept formation
paradigm designed to study the types of problem solving strategies used
by Ss under varying amounts of information content.

High IC Ss produced

the optimal strategy— focusing— sooner and more often than Medium or Low
IC Ss.

Medium IC Ss did better than low IC Ss.

High IC Ss increased

their use of focusing over trials, while Medium and Low IC Ss only used
focusing intermittently.

Medium and Low IC Ss used a non-optimal strategy

called hypothesis checking more than any other strategy.

There was more

variability in performance among Low IC Ss than among High IC Ss.

All Ss

in High IC were using focusing consistently by the last four problems,
while some Low IC Ss showed development of focusing and others did not.
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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

Over the last half century, the major dependent variables of
most research conducted by those who can collectively be called
"behaviorists" have consisted of simple, gross artd overt topographies
(Wisocki, 1977).

While early researchers required simple and arbi

trary topographies to avoid confounding (Skinner, 1953, 1969,

1976),

and to accurately extract the basic principles of behavior, we have
rapidly app- inched a time when more subtle and complex private
behavior must be analyzed if we are to understand human behavior in
its total complexity.

That persons "talk".to themselves, "visualize"

and use "strategies" when solving problems and other complex tasks is
taken for granted, but the specifics of what these behaviors are and
how they interact with one another, overt responses and consequences
are not well understood.

That such mediating behavior is possible

arises, at least in part, from the fact that once the individual
becomes a member of the verbal community he may direct his own behavior
as he would others.

Skinner

1976)

mentions the reinforcing effects of

such self directing behavior.
(verbal behavior) has a special character only because
it is reinforced by its effects on people— at first
other people, but eventually the speaker himself. As
a result, it is free of the spatial, temporal, and
mechanical relations which prevail between operant
behavior and nonsocial consequences... the important
consequence is that the speaker also becomes a listener
and may richly reinforce his own behavior (p. 88).
1
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It is clear that such behavior is of paramount importance.

Yet,

in a literature review of research in the area of private mediational
behavior, Ericsson and Simon (1980) cite only two studies of the 108
they reviewed that could be said to be done by behaviorists. And
these two studies, by Verplank (1962) and Greenspoon (1955), were
criticized as methodologically simplistic.

Not surprisingly, it is

the cognitive psychologists who now dominate this most important
area of research:

it has long been their traditional domain.

Though there has been a dearth of behavioral experimentation on
such behavior, the leading philosophers of a scientific-behavioralanalysis of such behavior have theorized about it liberally.

Both

Skinner (1953, 1957, 1976) and Kantor (1949, 1971) have pointed out
the importance of such behavior, and alluded to the need to make a
scientific— versus a mentalistic— analysis of it.

For example, Skinner

(1976) speculates about why there is such a plethora of covert behavior.
Covert behavior has the advantage that we can act without
committing ourselves; we can revoke the behavior and try
again if private consequences are not reinforcing...
Covert behavior is also easily observed and by no means
unimportant, and it was a mistake for methodological
behaviorism and certain versions of logical positivism
and structuralism to neglect it simply because it was
not "objective" (pp. 114, 115).
Later when discussing problem solving Skinner (1976) alludes to the
fact that people engage in strategies or patterns of responding— which
can be covert— in order to solve problems.
Solving a problem is, however, more than emitting the
response which is the solution; it is a matter of taking
steps to make that response more probable, usually by
changing the environment (p. 123).
And, in more behavioral speculation, Day (1977) has argued that there
are three ways in which private events may affect overt behavior.
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1) Feelings— or states of the body, as when we say we have a pain
because of private stimulation; 2) covert talking— a person may comand
his own behavior and be subsequently reinforced by its effects;
3) images— perceptual behavior or conditioned seeing may affect overt
responses as when we imagine a scene in order to describe it to someone.
Any or all of these phenomena may be involved in complex mediating
behavior.
The body of evidence demonstrating that persons are engaging in
various forms of covert and non-covert behavior in order to supplement
responding is well founded.

Cognitive psychologists have been

concerned with demonstrating that awareness (defined as the ability
to describe the contingencies of the experiment), is important to
learning.

Hirsch (1955)

and others (Philbrick & Postman, 1955) showed

that in a Thorndikian paradigm (saying "right" following a specified
response in a free association task), Ss who could verbalize the
contingencies performed better than those who could not.

They also

showed how experimental conditions can affect the number of aware
subjects and performance.

(Such as, Ss who discover the contin

gencies rather than being made aware through instructions perform
better.)

But why does being able to verbalize the contingency have

this effect?

The Behavioral objection could be that awareness is

simply a byproduct of learning; those who learned became aware because
there was something to be aware of.
Farber (1963) conducted an experiment where some Ss received
failure statements and others neutral statements following the first
20 trials in a study where Ss could pick the pronoun to be used in a

with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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statement.

The pronouns were "I", "You", "he" and "they".

The

experimenter said "good" whenever S in either group used the pronoun
"you".

The group with failure statements had fewer aware Ss and

made fewer correct statements.

He showed there were aware Ss who

could be classified as conforming versus nonconforming.

The noncon

forming Ss reported discovering the contingency and then not putting
it to use.

Such as the S who stated, "I first said 'you' a few’ more

times to prove I was right, then attempted to continue as before and
give all the pronouns equal utterance."

The conforming Ss also

reported discovering the contingencies, "thinking" about it, and
then deciding what they were going to do about it.

One S stated,

"At first I purposely avoided using 'you' any more than any other
pronoun because I felt like I was being conditioned into saying it.
Finally on the last five cards I purposely used 'you' because I felt
that possibly by not using it they would feel I had missed the whole
point of the experiment."

Clearly this Ss' overt responses must be

viewed in light of what he had to say privately about the experiment.
To be sure, the evidence does not argue for cognitive (mental?)
mediational states— nor should it— but it does argue that humans
engage in complex, subtle and often covert activities which supplement
their "targeted" responses which are measured by the experimenter.
Farber (1963) states about verbal reports that:
This does not mean the reports obtained need be regarded
as the manifest proof of an autonomous cognitive machinery
guiding our every action. These reports and the private
events to which they may point have their own determinants,
as susceptible to investigation as any other. But while
insisting that these events must themselves be accounted for,
we can use them to good advantage in predicting other kinds
of behavior and discovering the laws concerning them (p. 195).
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Behaviorists have also contributed to our knowledge about supple
mental behavior and contingencies involved therein.

Verplanck's now

famous paper "Unaware of Where's Awareness" (1962) offered a series of
experiments on awareness and the conditioning of verbal responses.
He showed that verbal responses concerning a task and the task itself
could be differentially reinforced.

It was shown that the task and

statements about it could be functionally independent.

Of course,

that statements can be independent does not mean they always are.

In

any case, the paper has been mired in controversy and fomented much
debate.

(See for example, Ericsson et al., 1980.)

Catania (1982) has shown that the manner in which one acquires
verbal behavior about a task effects one's performance on that task.
He instructed some Ss to make statements about contingencies and
shaped statements about them in another group.

His major finding

was that Ss who were shaped into talking about contingencies acted in
a manner consistent with their verbal behavior regardless of the
contingencies.

Ss merely told what to say did so, but this did not

carry over to responding to the contingencies; verbal responses and
non-verbal responses were independent.

We may argue from Verplanck

and Catania that verbal responses about a task may be supplemental
depending upon how such behavior is acquired.
The term "information" is often used in connection with conse
quences— and other contingencies— relating to problem solving,
concept formation, mathematics and other complex tasks that often
involve the above sorts of mediating behaviors.
suffers from a lack of specificity.

But the term easily

Place (1982) points out that
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Skinner— and perhaps the rest of the behavioral community— have over
looked the complex effects stimuli can have on the listener while
emphasizing the behavior of the speaker.

He notes that:

Whether we talk, as Skinner does, about tacts "extending
the listener's contact with his environment" or about
information stimuli "providing information about the
situation in which behavior occurs," the process whereby
verbal stimuli can convey information to the listener,
and thus enable him to make contact with aspects of his
environment which would otherwise be beyond his reach,
remains mysterious and unexplained (p. 121).
A useful way to talk about information, in a manner both empirical
and quantitative, was introduced by Shannon and Weaver (1949).

Infor

mation could be thought of as stimuli which reduce uncertainty,
that is the number of possible solutions is reduced.

If there are

four possible solutions to a given problem then reporting two of them
reduces the uncertainty by half; likewise we could say half the
necessary information was given.
A number of studies relating the effects of quantities of infor
mation to task performance have been done.

The classic study in

this area was performed by Trowbridge and Cason (1932).

They used

Thorndike's paradigm whereby Ss were blindfolded while attempting
to draw lines of a specified length.

The four Information Feedback

(IF) quantities were no IF, nonsense syllable, right/wrong— the right
being any response an eighth of an inch from the target— and the fourth
group received IF concerning deviations within an eighth of an inch.
The latter two groups showed increasing accuracy while the first two
did not; greater quantities of IF improved performance.

But the

interesting fact was that on post experiment interviews Ss in the
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latter three groups reported using covert strategies— cues as they
were called— while doing the task.

The authors report that:

The principal cues used were kinaesthetic cues from the arm
and hand. A "timing" method was also frequently employed
in which the Ss estimated the time required for the whole
movement of the arm. Of the 47 Ss who used cues, 9 listened
to the sound of their pencil as they moved it across the
paper, and 7 counted at a regular rate and tried to determine
the number of counts which they made while they drew a line
of the correct length. At the beginning of the experiment,
37 Ss attempted to estimate the 3-inch line by thinking of
a ruler, by thinking of an inch and then taking it three
times, or by estimating the width of the hand or the length
of the thumb, etc. In the "blank" and "nonsense" procedures,
a number of Ss attempted to use visual imagery (p. 252).
It is clear that even in this simple task humans engaged in covert
behavior and strategies in order to facilitate the task.

Annett (1969)

reports a series of studies done for the Navy concerning positioning
levers and rudders, where quantities of IF did not significantly
improve responding.

But Annett (1969)

showed with his own lever

pulling experiment that high quantities of IF were not greatly
improving scores because Ss were not "using" all the available IF.
He states (p. 144), "using" may be a reference to covert behavior;
greater quantities of IF may be useful only when they supplement
mediating behavior.
While there is some evidence that quantities of IF effect perfor
mance on some tasks, all of this research has been done with manual
tasks.

The quantitative effects of IF on conceptual tasks and their

related behaviors is not nearly as detailed.
Many researchers have looked specifically at how information
presentation and strategies for concept formation interrelate.
Bruner, Goodnow & Austin (1956) have presented a series of experiments
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demonstrating that Ss in concept formation tasks use different strate
gies to discover the solution.

Different strategies provide various

amounts of information per trial, and the strategies used are influenced
by the experimental conditions.

Bruner manipulated, for example,

temporal variables and instructions to Ss and found, as expected, that
the types of strategies used varied; when the task was made more
difficult more conservative strategies were employed, when the task
was made easier Ss tended to try riskier strategies that supplied more
information when they were correct.

Yabe (1981) examined how Bruner's

strategy types were affected by feedback conditions rather than
antecedent manipulations as Bruner had done.

His Ss received either

consistent feedback across trials, feedback that minimized the number
of possibilities that could be eliminated, or received random feedback
that might or might not allow the elimination of possibilities.

Ss

in the first group maintained their initial strategies throughout
the study.

Ss in the second group developed more cautious strategies

as the experiment progressed, and— contrary to expectation— 'Ss in the
third group maintained consistency in their selections across problems
like the Ss in the first group.
Other researchers have shown how even in extremely complex
concept formation designs Ss use strategies to discover solutions.
Laughlin, Lange & Adamopoulos (1982) used a game, Mastermind, to look
at problem solving strategies.
to

The Ss had to discover the solution

a four positional by three color pattern of stimuli.

Although

this meant there were 81 possible solutions to sort through, Ss
demonstrated the use of two kinds of strategies he called Focusing
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and tactical.

Ss using Focusing would first discover the four correct

colors and then their proper respective positions.

Ss using a tactical

strategy would systematically discover the correct color for each
successive position.

Both strategies were difficult, requiring ten

or more trials to solve.

Raaijmakers (1981) demonstrated systematic

elimination of disconfirmed hypotheses— local consistency— occurs as
often in more complex concept problems as in simpler ones.

One group

had to solve four dimensional by two feature problems, another four
dimensional by four feature problems where Ss were told which dimen
sion contained the solution, and another group solved four dimension
by four feature problems where the solution could belong to any of
the dimensions and Ss were not informed of which one.

All groups

showed consistent use of logical elimination by local consistency.
Levine (1975) and his associates have done a series of experiments
on the developmental nature of strategies used to discover concepts.
Levine and Phillips presented Ss with pairs of stimuli that varied
across four dimensions with two values to each dimension— hence 8
possible solutions.

The S would then pick the stimulus that they

thought contained the correct feature.
indicating the correct stimulus.

The E would supply IF by

The stimuli were arranged such that

half the possible remaining solutions were eliminated on each selection,
so that by the fourth IF the S should know the solution if he is using
the correct strategy.

The most efficient strategy of narrowing the

possibilities down to 8,4,2 and 1 possibilities respectively is called
focusing.

There are other strategies that are less efficient.

Dimen

sion Checking consists of picking a feature of one of the dimensions
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until told "incorrect", and then going on to another feature from
another dimension in the same manner until the problem is solved.
Hypothesis Checking entails the systematic elimination of each dimen
sion by selecting one of the features of the dimension until told
"wrong" and then selecting the other feature of that dimension until
it too is eliminated.
focusing.

Neither of these strategies

is as efficient as

Levine's results indicate that children do not use efficient

strategies while most adults do.

He did not, however, manipulate

information quantity; all his studies involved IF that eliminated
half the remaining possibilities on each subsequent trial with only
eight possibilities in all.
Gholoson & O'Connor (1975) used Levine's technique but they
employed a four dimensional three valued paradigm.

Ss were presented

with three stimuli at a time, each of which contained four of the
possible solutions that the other two did not; all 12 possible
solutions were distributed evenly between the three stimuli.

Ss in

the partial IF group were only told "right" or "wrong" when they
made their selections, so if they were wrong only a third of the
possible solutions were eliminated.

In the complete IF group the E

pointed to the correct stimulus at each IF, so that eight possibilities
could be eliminated on any given trial regardless whether they were
right or wrong.

His results showed children did not use efficient

strategies in the partial IF group while the other Ss in the complete
IF— higher information feedback— group did.
Some researchers— most working with children— have looked at how
qualitative differences in information presentation can affect
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strategies in concept formation.

Anderson (1977) taught sixth graders

to discriminate four dimensional problems by giving either the correct
solution at each feedback, or giving the correct solution with an explana
tion of how to discover the solution, or by giving the correct answer
and requiring the child to verbalize the correct steps in solving the
problem.

Ss in the third condition solved problems more efficiently

(though there was no statistical significance) than Ss in the first
group.

Rosser and Brody (1981) looked at how different modeling proce

dures affected the generalization of concept formation skills in
preschoolers.

Ss were exposed to one of four modeling situations in

which they were shown how different lengths of wood were to be put in
a specified pattern.

In one group Ss had a model show four examples

and four non-examples, an explanation of what was to be done, a
description of the individual stimuli, and were told the rule for
proper sorting.

In the second group Ss were given the examples and

non-examples along with the rule.
only the examples and non-examples.

In the third group Ss were given
The fourth group was a control

where Ss merely were allowed to play with the blocks for a few moments.
Ss then did the modeled task five times.

Following this the Ss were

shown the stimuli in random order and three pictures of the stimuli.
Two of the pictures showed the stimuli disordered and the third the
stimuli in the correct order; Ss had to pick the correct picture.
Also, when given a randomly ordered set of stimuli Ss had to draw a
picture of how the stimuli would look in correct order.

All groups

did well on the first generalization problem, but only the first
group could generalize solutions to the drawing problem.
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While we know Ss use strategies in problem solving, and that
quantitative information is a way of treating stimulus presentation,
the relation between the two has not been methodically analyzed for
more complex behaviors.

The present research will look specifically

at how varying quantities of information in a complex concept formation
design affect the problem solving strategies of adults.

Other

researchers have used qualitative measures of information presenta
tion to look at strategies in concept formation, but this makes it
difficult to generalize across studies.

A quantitative analysis

will allow for greater precision in the control of independent
variables, specifically supplying a method for looking at how amounts
of information affect strategy behavior in concept formation.
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CHAPTER I I

METHOD

Setting

The experiment was carried out in a small observation room at
Croyden School.

The room was sealed off by two way mirrors and

contained a desk with two chairs.

S sat on one side of the desk,

directly across from the experimenter (E), about three feet apart.

Subjects
There were 30 subjects (S) in the study, 27 undergraduates and
3 graduate students who worked at the school.

The school, Croyden

Avenue School, specializes in the educating of severely retarded
children and young adults.

Ss were teachers and tutors who imple

mented educational procedures for this population.
between December and January.

Ss were tested

Ss were placed randomly into one of

three conditions, ten Ss to a condition.

The conditions were Low,

Medium and High Information Content (IC) groups.

Procedure
Prior to the start of the experiment each S was shown the first
stimulus card, and was then presented with the following set of
instructions.
- This is a concept formation study.
- There are 15 problems in the study.
13
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- Each problem consists of 20 stimulus cards presented one at a
time. There are 2 stimuli on each card, between them all 16
concepts can be found.
- The object is for you to discover as fast as possible which
of the possible concept features is the correct solution.
(E then
describes the 16 possible solutions)
- This is

how you will get information:

- On each trial you will be allowed to look at the stimulus
card for 5 seconds.
- You will then select the stimulus which you think contains
the correct concept, left or right.
- I will then tell you
stimulus or not.

if you have selected the correct

- If you have a hypothesis, you will then tell me what you
thought the correct solution is.
- After you have correctly stated the correct solutiona
certain
number of times, I will inform you andwewill go
on to the next problem.
- After the conclusion of the experiment, I would like you to
fill out a questionnaire.
Ethen modeled the appropriate behavior for
solution and showing the

the S by picking a possible

S how he/she would point to the stimulus

containing that feature, wait for feedback and then state the concept
he/she thought was the solution.
The S was prompted by the E to state all 16 possible solutions
prior to each problem.

Ss were informed of any feature they forgot.

The E would place a stimulus card in front of the S who had
five seconds to study it.

The S then would point to the stimulus

that he/she thought contained the solution.

The E would respond by

saying "correct" if S picked the stimulus with the correct feature,
or "incorrect" if S chose the stimulus that did not contain the solu
tion.

If S did not respond within five seconds, E would give one
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prompt to respond by saying "choose please".
immediately the next card was presented.

If the S did not respond

Following feedback, the S

would inform the E of what he/she thought the correct solution was.
The card was then moved to the left of the S and left face up so
that it could be easily seen.
the same manner.

The next card was then presented in

After S responded to each subsequent card it was

placed face up next to the previously exposed cards in serial order.
This continued for the first eight cards of every group.

Following

this the lowest numbered card would be turned over prior to exposing
the next card; hence, card one was turned over just prior to exposing
card nine.

This established a pattern of allowing the S to observe

the last eight cards that had been turned up to that point.
The S was considered to have solved the problem when he/she
stated the solution four times in a row.

Once the S had solved

the problem he/she was informed and went directly to the next problem.
If the S did not solve the problem in the allotted 20 trials he/she
was informed of the answer and went immediately to the next problem.
All solutions were selected randomly, and any given solution could
occur more than once.

Following completion of the experiment each S

was asked to fill out a questionnaire consisting of seven questions
(see appendix B ) .

Materials
Each S, tested individually, was presented with a series of
15 problems, with each problem consisting of 20 separate stimulus
cards.

Each card was 5 x 8

inches and had two stimuli on it.

stimulus was 3*5 x 3 inches in size.

Each

The two stimuli differed from
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one another on eight different dimensions: alphabetic letter, T or X;
color of letter, black or white; size of .letter, large or small; type
of letter, script or block; position, left or right; number of borders,
one or two; line position, line on top or line on bottom; and star
position, star on left or star on right.
varied between the two stimuli.

The eight dimensions always

Hence, one stimulus is always black

the other is white, one script and the other block, etc.

This

produces 16 possible solutions, eight of which are in one stimulus,
and eight of which are in the other.

(See Fig. 1.)

FIGURE 1 - SAMPLE STIMULI
Fig. 1 shows a typical stimulus card. The 16 possible solutions are
present in every stimulus card, 8 of them in the stimulus on the
left, and 8 of them in the stimulus on the right. The 8 solutions
in the stimulus on the right are small letter, t, block letter,
white, 2 borders, line on bottom, star on right, and position right.
The 8 solutions in the stimulus on the left are large letter, x,
script letter, black, 1 border, line on top, star on left, and
position left.
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The way in which the cards differ between the experimental groups
is in the number of features that change from card to card.

In the

High IC group half the remaining unchanged features are altered on
each subsequent card.

So, on the first card the correct feature

would be paired with seven other incorrect ones (which would leave
eight possible solutions).

On the next card the correct feature would

be paired with only three of the seven previous features (which would
narrow the possible solutions down from eight to four).

On the third

card the correct feature would be paired with only one of the three
remaining incorrect features (which would narrow the possible solutions
from four to two).

The fourth card would contain the correct feature

without the last incorrect feature.

A S using a Focusing strategy in

the High IC group can then discover the solution in the first four
cards regardless of his/her selections.

(See Fig. 2.1.)

Stimulus

cards for the Medium IC group will allow the elimination of two of
the remaining possibilities on each card following the initial card.
Hence, card one will leave eight possible solutions, card two will
leave six possible solutions, card three will leave four possible
solutions, card four will leave two possible solutions, and card five
will leave one solution if the S is using a focusing strategy.

A S

using Focusing in the Medium IC group will need to see the first five
cards to solve the problem.

(See Fig. 2.2.)

Stimulus cards for each

problem in the Low IF group will allow the elimination of only one
feature per card following the initial card.

The first card will

leave eight possibilities, the second card seven, the third card
six...and the eighth card only one if the S is using focusing.

A S in

the Low IF group using a Focusing strategy will need to see the first
eight cards to solve the problems.

(See Fig. 2.3.)
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Fig. 2.1 shows the first 2 cards of a typical problem in the High IC
group. A S using a focusing strategy can narrow the number of pos
sible solutions down to 4 by the second card. If the solution is
x, then a S using focusing will know that 1 of the eight features
on the left is the solution after the first feedback: black, small,
script, x, 2 borders, position left, star right or line on bottom.
Card 2 pairs only 2 borders, script and position left with x, so
black, small, line on bottom and star on right can be eliminated
after the second feedback.

Fig. 2.2 shows the first 2 cards of a typical problem in the Medium
IC group. A S using a focusing strategy can narrow the number of
possible solutions down to 6 by the second card. If the solution is
star on right, then a S using focusing will know that 1 of the eight
features on the right is the solution after the first feedback: T,
block, white, large, 1 border, line on top, star on right or position
right. Card 2 again pairs T, block, white, large, and position
right with star on right, so 1 border and line on top can be
eliminated after the second feedback.

Fig. 2.3 shows the first 2 cards of a typical problem in the Low IC
group. A S using a focusing strategy can narrow the number of
possible solutions down to 7 by the second card. If the solution is
black, then a S using focusing will know that 1 of 8 features on the
left is the solution after the first feedback: black, script, x,
large, 1 border, line on top, star on left or position left. Card 2
again pairs script, large, 1 border, star on left, line on top and
position left with black, so only x can be eliminated after the
second feedback.
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The remainder of the 20 cards for each problem vary the features
randomly with the stipulation that no two features are paired together
for more than four cards in a row.

This allows the S to use other

strategies, but only the first 4, 5 or 8 cards— depending on the IC
group— are structured to allow the S to use a focusing strategy.

A

single set of secondary cards is used for all three groups.

Dependent Variables

The data for each problem consisted of a "correct" or "incorrect"
selection on each trial, and the Ss hypothesis of what he/she thought
the answer was, such as "black."
sheet.)

(See the appendix for a sample data

From these data it was possible to extract the main dependent

variables, which were the strategies consistent with Ss behavior in
solving the problems.

There were 4 such strategies categorized in the

present study.

Focusing

In a focusing strategy the S logically eliminates all the remaining
possible solutions that any given card allows, and his/her selections
are only those possibilities that have not yet been logically eliminated
Hence, it is the most efficient manner in which to discover the solution
For the present research a S was considered to be using focusing in
the High and Medium IC group if, a) the Ss hypotheses consist only of
those possibilities that have not yet been logically eliminated right
through the end of the problem, and b) the S does not state the
correct solution before the 3rd trial of the problem.

Stating and
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maintaining the correct solution before the 3rd trial for the high
and medium IC groups is merely considered a lucky guess.

For the low

IC group a S was considered to be using focusing if a) the Ss hypotheses
consisted only of those possibilities that had not yet been logically
eliminated right through the end of the problem, and b) the S does
not state the correct solution before the 5th trial of the problem.
Stating the solution prior to the 5th trial when the S is showing a
focusing strategy in the Low IF group is considered a lucky guess.

Dimension Checking

This is a less efficient strategy, the S does not respond to all
the available IC, so it will take longer for the S to discover the
solutions with dimension checking.

A S using dimension checking

picks a feature from a dimension and continues to pick that feature
until he/she is told "incorrect", then the S picks another feature
from another dimension and picks that feature until told "incorrect";
the S does this until he/she finds the solution.

For example, a S

might try the size dimension and pick "large", the S will continue
to pick "large" until told "incorrect", and then try another dimension
such as color.

The S would then pick "black" until told "incorrect",

then proceed to another dimension until the problem is solved.

In

the present research a S was considered to be using dimension checking
if he/she followed the above pattern of responding, and did not
deviate from it on more than one trial per problem, by either changing
hypotheses after being told "correct", or by keeping the same hypotheses
after being told "incorrect".
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Hypothesis Testing

Like dimension checking, hypothesis testing does not involve the
use of all the available IC, so it takes Ss longer to solve a problem
with this strategy than it would with focusing.

In hypothesis testing

a S picks a feature from a dimension until told "incorrect", and then
picks the other feature of that dimension until told "incorrect".
this manner every dimension is systematically eliminated.

In

For

example, a S using hypothesis testing might first eliminate the
letter dimension by picking "T" until told "incorrect", and then
picking "X" until told "incorrect".

The S would then go on to another

dimension until he/she solved the problem.

In the present research

a S was considered to be using hypothesis testing if he/she went
through at least 2 dimensions in the above manner, from the start of
the problem, before solving it.

Illogical Responding

A S was using an illogical responding pattern when either, 1) the
S was using dimension checking, but the S made more than 1 mistake by
either picking a hypothesis again after being told "incorrect", or
changing a hypothesis after being told "correct"; or 2) the S was
using hypothesis testing, and either picked a hypothesis again after
being told "incorrect", or changed a hypothesis after being told
"correct" at any time in the problem.
The other dependent variable was the trial on which the S
"solved" the problem.

Since the problem was considered solved when

the S stated the solution 4 times in a row, the first trial of the
4 was considered the one on which the problem was solved.

So if a S
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states the solution on the 3rd trial, but on either the Ath, 5th or 6th
trial changes his/her response, then the problem is not solved.

If then

on the 11th, 12th, 13th and 14th trials the S goes back to the correct
solution the problem will be considered "solved" on the 11th trial.

Reliability

Reliability was measured by having an assistant take data along
with the E on two randomly selected Ss from each IC group.

(Each datum

consisted of a correct or incorrect selection and what the S thought
the solution was).

The assistant sat about five feet to the right

of the E, making it difficult for her to see the Es data sheet.
Reliability was measured by dividing agreements plus disagreements
into agreements.

The overall reliability for all six Ss was 98%.

Pilot Subjects

One Pilot S was run from each experimental group to 1) assess the
effects of leaving cards face up, versus turning cards over right after
S gets IC; and 2) assess the amount of time required for Ss to make a
choice following presentation of the cards.

The necessity of leaving

cards face up after feedback was assessed by using the above procedure
until S had completed the first ten problems.

The very next problem was

then presented with only one card observable at a time.

No S was then

able to exhibit a focusing strategy, and all three Ss reported that they
merely resorted to guessing— dimension checking— under such circumstances.
The time required was measured by using the above procedure, but letting
S respond whenever they were ready.

The High, Medium and Low IF Ss

averaged 3.3, 3.6 and 2 seconds respectively.
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CHAPTER I I I

FINDINGS

Main results indicate that Ss with greater amounts of IC
developed the most efficient strategy— focusing— sooner, and used it
more often, than Ss who received less IC per trial.

As can be seen

in Fig. 3, 60% of all the problems solved by the High IC group were
done so with a focusing strategy.

Focusing dropped to 36% of the

solutions in the Medium IC group, and to 28% in the Low IC group.
None of the three conditions generated appreciable amounts of
hypothesis checking.

In fact, the 1% shown by the Medium IC group

and the 4% shown by the low IC group are each data from 1 S on 1
problem; out of 450 total problems in the study only 2 showed the
use of hypothesis checking.
Dimension checking was used in 26% of the total problems by the
High IC group— less than half the number of times focusing was used.
In the Medium IC condition the amount of dimension checking is 42%,
6% more than the amount of Focusing.

Interestingly, S who only

need to use one more card for an optimal strategy— 5 cards for
Medium IF, versus 4 for the Low IF group— nonetheless now use nonoptimal strategies more often than they use the optimal one.
the Low IC group used dimension checking 34% of the time.

Ss in

Although,

like the Medium IC group, this means Low IC Ss used dimension
checking 6% more than they used focusing, there is not a consistent
trend of more dimension checking as IC amounts decrease.

The low IC

24
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group has less focusing and less dimension checking than the Medium
IC group.

The difference is accounted for by the large percentage

of illogical and other strategies exhibited by the Low IC group.
Illogical strategies— those in which responding patterns were incon
sistent (see METHODS)— were 19% for the Low IC group.

This was 7%

more than the Medium IC group, and nearly 4 times greater than the
number of illogical strategies shown by the High IC group.
A comparison between an average S in each of the three condi
tions is presented in Fig. 4.

The important datum from this figure is

the trial on which the focusing strategy first appeared.

For High IC

Ss the average trial on which the focusing strategy appeared was
Number 3.

Ss in the Medium IC group did not show focusing until the

5th trial on average, and the Low IC group did not show it until the
7th trial on average; this is more than twice the number of trials
it took the High IC group to develop the optimal strategy.

This

distinction is further borne out by the fact that every High IC S
exhibited the Focusing strategy by the 6th trial, while there were
2 Ss in the Low IC group who did not show the optimal strategy until
the last problem, and 1 S who did not show it at all.
Fig. 5 lets us see the differences produced by the three condi
tions.

The graphs present the number of trials it took the best and

the worst S from each IC group to solve all the problems; the best S
using the least total trials, and the worst using the most.

Except

for problems 6 and 7 and 10 and 11, where the worst S in the High IC
group faltered, the two curves are similar.

The graph of the worst

S is typical of most Ss in the High IC condition.

The Ss improved
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rapidly, but faltered a few times during the middle problems, before
showing consistency in the last quarter of problems.

As was already

noted, by the 3rd trial focusing was occurring in the High IC group,
but it was the last 4 trials where all the Ss showed consistency.
If we look at the strategies used by the 10 Ss in the High IC group
on problems 12, 13, 14 and 15 we see that 37 of the 40 problems were
solved with a focusing strategy.

On problems 7 , 8 , 9 and 10 the High

IC Ss used Focusing 27 of 40 times.

Clearly Ss in the High IC groups

were using a focusing strategy a lot by the middle of the study— 68%—
but by the last 4 trials it was being used by virtually every S on
every problem.
The differences between the best and worst Ss in the Medium IC
group was larger than that of the High IC group.

While every S in the

Medium IC group exhibited the focusing strategy by the 7th trial,
they never developed the consistent use of it that the High IC group
did.

The focusing strategy was used by the 10 Ss in the Medium IC

group on problems 12, 13, 14 and 15 only 18 of 40 times.

While on

problems 7, 8, 9 and 10 it was used 18 of 40 times as well.

There

is no net gain in the use of a focusing strategy from the middle to
the end problems of the Medium IC group.
The graph of the variance for the Low IC group shows massive
differences in the responding of the worst and the best S; there is
no relation between the 2 curves at all.

The worst S in the Low IC

group never showed a focusing strategy, and was unable to even solve
6 of the problems.
the problems.

The best S used focusing 8 times, more than half

And the worst was byno means atypical, Ss 1, 2, 3, 7
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and 8 did almost as poorly.

Like the Medium IC group, the Low IF group

showed no systematic increase in the use of focusing.

On problems

12, 13, 14 and 15 the 10 Ss in the Low IC group used focusing on
23 of 40 problems.

On problems 7, 8, 9 and 10 they used it on 19 of

40 problems.
Clearly as the amount of IC decreases the effect is less system
atic; both in the sense that individual S scores vary more, and in
the sense that Ss do not improve as much over trials.
point is reinforced by the data in Fig. 6.

This second

Fig. 6.1 shows the average

trial on which Ss in the High IF group solved each problem.

The curve

shows a steady decrease in the average number of trials to solution
over problems.

The average number of trials to criterion over the

first 3 problems for the High IC group was 8.2, and the average over
the last three problems was 5.3.

The Medium IC groups aggregate data

of average number of trials to solution, in Fig. 6.2, shows no
systematic decline in the average number of trials to criterion
The

average number of trials to criteria over the first 3 problems

for the Medium IC group was 11.6, and the average over the last 3
problems was 9.4 trials, a slight decrease.

The Low IC group showed

more of an improvement over problems than did the Medium IC group
(Fig. 6.3), even though they did not use a focusing strategy progres
sively over problems.

The average number of trials to criterion over

the first 3 problems for the Low IC group was 13, and the average
over the last 3 problems was 9.6.
Figs. 6.1, 6.2, and 6.3 cannot be directly compared because the
amounts of IC for each group differ.

But trials on which Ss did not
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use focusing can be compared since Ss in higher IC groups are not using
the extra IC anyway.

Fig. 6.4 shows the curves of all three groups

when only non-optimal strategies are used.

Although we would expect

them to be similar, it is clear that the Ss in the Low IC group
required many more trials on the average to solve the problems,
even though they were using the same strategies as the other two
groups.

The Low IC group averaged a lower number of trials to

criteria than one of the other two groups on only 3 of 15 problems
when all three groups were using non-optimal strategies.

R eproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

CHAPTER I V

DISCUSSION

The present results demonstrate differences in the strategic
behavior of Ss who are exposed to varying quantities of information
in a concept formation paradigm.

Ss in the High IC group developed

the optimal strategy quickly, faltered in the middle problems, but
were very consistent in their use of focusing on the last quarter
of the problems.

Ss in the Medium IC group developed the optimal

strategy by the 5th problem, but never showed a consistent tendency
to use it on later problems: they did not show an increase of focusing
over problems.

Ss in the Low IC group did not develop the optimal

strategy until almost half way through the experiment— problem 7 on
average— and also did not show a tendency to increase the use of
focusing over problems.

The Low IC Ss did improve slightly in

trials to criterion over problems however, because their non-optimal
strategies improved in efficiency on the last few problems.

The

effects of the treatments were more uniform over Ss as IC increased.
This could be seen in the differences between the best and worst S in
each group.

All the Ss in the High IC group developed the optimal

strategy and used it almost exclusively on the last 4 problems.
Conversely, some Ss in the Low IC group managed to develop and use
the optimal strategy on more than half the problems, while other Ss
did not use the optimal strategy more than once.
33
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An interesting discrepancy between the present research and other
studies that looked at strategies in concept formation is in the amount
of hypothesis checking reported.

These studies (Philips & Levine,

1975; Mims & Gholson, 1978; Gholson & O ’Connor) report between 8% and
40% of their Ss used hypothesis checking in various treatments.
is much more than the present research reports.

This

Apart from methodolo

gical differences, this discrepancy may have to do with the fact
that these other studies used mostly children as Ss, and that their
concept formation paradigms used fewer dimensions.

In any case, adults

in the present research did not use hypothesis checking to solve
N
complex concept formation problems.
There are several possible reasons for the fact that the Ss in the
Low IC group did so much poorer than the Ss in the High IC group.

The

Ss in the Low IC group had to do more memorizing for much longer than
did the High or Medium IC groups.

A S in the Low IC group would

possibly have to remember information gleaned from the first card for
seven more trials before he/she finally knew the answer.

Temporally,

that means the S would have to remember some information up to (5 sec.
x 8 cards) 40 seconds while constantly trying to remember other
possibilities and engage in strategic behavior.
time required to solution was greater.
to be remembered.

The sheer amount of

Compounding that is the amount

Ss in the Low IC group trying to remember the posi

tions of "correct" or "incorrect" choices would have twice the number
of locations to recall as the High IC group.

These two additional

requirements, in concert, could inhibit S performance when he/she is
trying to use focusing.

Ss did, in fact, show a great deal of forget

ting when the number of trials to solution was high.

On problems
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where Ss needed eight or more trials to solve the problem, 73% showed
forgetting by reselecting at least one solution that had already been
directly disconfirmed by an "incorrect" when originally picked.
Further research on memorization behavior could control for
forgetting by marking the selections of the S, so that he/she does
not have to remember which stimuli were selected, in order to test the
role of memory in this type of research.
Another possible factor in the differences between IC groups
is in the relative efficiency of using the optimal strategy for
the various groups.

For Low IC Ss both optimal and non-optimal

strategies lead to the elimination of only one possibility at a time.
The optimal strategy is a little more systematic, because it does not
require a disconfirmation to eliminate a possibility, but that is its
only advantage over the non-optimal strategies for Low IC Ss.

But

the optimal strategy is much more useful than non-optimal strategies
for the High and Medium IC Ss.

These Ss can always eliminate two

or more possibilities per trial with focusing, while a non-optimal
strategy can eliminate one possibility per trial at best.

For Low

IC Ss the optimal strategy offers little more efficiency than nonoptimal strategies and requires more work— in comparison and analysis—
that simple strategies don't require.

The dubious value of focusing

for Low IC Ss may simply make the work required in using it greater
than the benefits.
Closely related to the above point is the effect that adventitious
reinforcement may have had on Low IC Ss.

For these Ss any guess

occurring on or before the 8th trial— with say dimension checking—
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would be at least as likely to be correct as one using the optimal
strategy.

For Low IC Ss guessing was more likely to pay off than

for High IC Ss who would have to get the solution within four trials
to make guessing as efficient as using focusing.

Trials on which a

guess would be reinforcing for the Low IC group would be inefficient
for the High IC Ss, since they could have gotten the answer sooner
by using focusing: the Low IC treatment reinforces guessing rather
than using strategies.
While the Low IC treatment did not foster the use of the optimal
strategy, the High IC treatment did.

The subtle and complex behavior

involved in using focusing was not instructed, it appeared because
the High IC situation provided circumstances for its occurrence.

In

a situation with much change, and a great deal of information to be
dealt with, it is economical to have strategies to sort out the
possibilities, thus increasing the probability of finding the solu
tion.

When methodically given small amounts of information Ss only

need to integrate the pieces as they come in, complex sorting and
comparing is not required.

More complex strategies that involve

looking at, comparing, and contrasting possibilities are useful only
when there is a great deal of information to respond to.

Strategies

for problem solving may generate and occur simply because of the
problem solving contingencies, regardless of historical or instruc
tional variables.

However, the exact interplay between antecedent

exposure to "instruction" and quantitative IC contingencies is in
need of further study.
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That exposure to the High IC treatment generated a general
tendency to seek as much information as possible was alluded to in
Fig. 6.4, which showed that Low IC Ss took more trials to criterion
than the other two groups on problems where focusing was not used.
This contention is further borne out by data from question #5 on
the questionnaire.

Answers to the question were rated by the E and

an assistant (Reliability = 87%) on the number of face-up cards Ss
reported looking at when solving problems.

Each Ss response to the

question was placed in one of four categories: 1) S did not make
comparisons between cards; 2) S reports generally comparing two or
more cards per trial; 3) S reports generally comparing all available
cards per trial; or 4) Ss answer was irrelevant.

In the High IC

group, seven of the ten Ss reported perusing all the available cards,
and the other three reported generally observing two or more cards
per trial.

There were four Medium IC Ss who reported perusing all

the available cards while five reported looking at two or more, and
one S who reported only looking at one card at a time.

In the low IC

condition only one S reported perusing all the cards available, while
six reported perusing two or more cards per trial, and three Ss
reported only observing one card per trial.
Clearly, Ss who received more information on the initial trials
of the problems— High and Medium IC— reported tendencies to use more
of the information made available on secondary trials.

Specifically,

on problems where focusing was not used, these Ss developed "protooptimal" strategies: dimension checking where the selections are
determined by comparisons of previous cards on which the S was told
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"correct".

A S using a proto-optimal strategy would select a feature

as in dimension checking, and continue to pick it until told "incorrect".
Instead of then randomly picking another feature that had not yet been
eliminated the S would look over the cards that he/she had been told
"correct" on, and see what feature(s) had been paired with the one
they had been selecting.

The S would then proceed to choose one of

these features on the next trial.

(Ss anecdotally reported using

proto-optimal strategies, and mentioned using it on the questionnaire.
Typical Ss wrote "I compared cards to determine after each ’correct’
response what features the cards had in common", and "I'd pick a
solution on the first card and keep that going until I was told it
was 'incorrect', while watching the 'pattern' of the previous cards,
thereby observing similarities of previous cards so when I got an
'incorrect', I'd have a high probability guess as to another solution
based on what all my correct previous answers had in common".
rather concise descriptions are consistent with the data).

These

The Ss in

the High IC group attempted to extract as much information as possible
more often than Ss in the Low IC group, even when both groups were
using the same strategy with the same set of cards.

The tendency to

use all available information, that was reinforced on the initial
cards in the High IC group, carried over on to trials where only
non-optimal strategies could be used.

Conversely, Ss in the Low IC

group, who were not initially reinforced for using all available
information, did not use as much of the extra information that could
be obtained from the secondary cards, which were presented on later
trials of the problems.

(The secondary cards altered at least four
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features on each successive card, potentially making each secondary
card four times as informative as the eight initial cards in the Low
IC group).
We may ask if Ss who "learn” not to use all available informa
tion would have trouble adjusting to High IC situations, by, for
example, first exposing Ss to the Low IC treatment and then to the
High IC treatment.

Will these Ss do worse than Ss who are directly

exposed to High IC?

It is possible that a specifically engineered

history of information deprivation may predispose people to act in
less efficient ways even though other more useful alternatives are
available.

This is analogously seen in learned helplessness, where

organisms who have no history of successful escape merely tolerate
aversive stimulation when obvious paths of escape are made available.
If this is so, then we must be careful not to expose vulnerable
populations, such as the retarded and mentally ill, to environments
where their already diminished capacities may be further channeled
into simplicity.

Unlucky "normal" persons will most likely be

exposed to more complex environments which will counteract—
eventually?—

the effects of Low IC situations, but the mentally

handicapped— who often are exposed to more complex environments only
as they prove themselves capable— are not as mobile, and therefore
more susceptible to such stigmatizations.
The question of how these findings generalize to other concept
formation paradigms is another area for further research.

In a study

by Grover and Fowler (1979) children were taught juxtapositional
concepts, involving the positioning of blocks in a pattern, by
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matching a model.

Ss who had an obstructed view of the model had to

develop hypothesis about how and where blocks were to be placed.
These Ss did better on generalization problems that presented only
a photo of the stimulus complex, rather than an actual model, than
the Ss who did not have to develop hypotheses; Ss who learned to
compare and analyze in a concept situation were able to generalize
the skills to another situation.

Will this work with quantitative

information paradigms?
A more global problem involves the extent to which this phenom
enon generalizes to problem solving situations in general.

Does the

quantitative information effect extend to other "higher mental
processes" like math, logic and language training?

A similar design

with other materials is required.
The present research has educational implications concerning
the amount of material that should be presented at one time.

If

this phenomenon generalizes, at least within concept formation
paradigms, it could be useful to increase the rate of exposure of
information in some settings.

The tendency to control flows of

information so as to not overwhelm children— in, for example, DISTAR—
may not produce the strategic behavior necessary to cope with large
amounts of information; which surely children must face eventually
anyway.

When a problem is presented in its entire myriad of complexity,

the learner is in a position to develop and use strategies for solving
complex— High IC— problems.

A quantitative approach to information

flow would allow for the controlled exposure of information in
greater amounts without resorting to extremes of either overwhelming
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complexity or simplistic hand-holding characteristic of so much computer
assisted instruction.
It is typical of many of the developmentalist educators to
eschew the importance of environmental factors— such as information
amounts— in favor of a static notion of developmental stages.

Piaget

(1969), who is a mentor to many with this view, expounded a notion
which he termed "genetic epistemology", the gist of which is that it
is virtually useless to try to teach something to a child until he/she
has entered a preordained stage.

The effect of this Platonic philosophy

is to encourage researchers and educators to take a passive stance
towards education rather than an active attempt to accelerate "develop
ment" through enriched environments.
ignore the environment.

(Albeit, Piaget did not completely

He wrote, "Man tends to organize his behavior

and thought and to adapt to the environment."

But he immediately fol

lowed it with, "These tendencies result in a number of psychological
structures which take different forms at different ages.

The child

progresses through a series of stages...before he attains adult
intelligence").

Skinner (1976) accurately points out that:

If a child no longer behaves as he behaved a year before,
it is not only because he has grown but because he has
had the time to acquire a much bigger repertoire 'through
exposure to new contingencies of reinforcement, and
particularly because the contingencies affecting children
at different ages are different. A child's world "develops,"
too (p. 75).
That these "new contingencies" should be complex, that we should expose
learners to as much information as they can handle, is implicit in the
present research.
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A PPEN D IX B

QUESTIONNAIRE

IF GROUP:

SS#:

DATE:

1) EACH CARD ALLOWED YOU TO ELIMINATE SOME OF THE POSSIBLE SOLUTIONS
BY TELLING YOU WHICH CONCEPTS MIGHT BE RIGHT OR WRONG. ON THE AVERAGE,
DID EACH CARD LET YOU ELIMINATE A LOT, A FEW, OR ONLY ONE POSSIBLE
SOLUTION?

2) WHAT IS THE MINIMAL NUMBER OF CARDS IT TAKES TO DISCOVER THE
SOLUTION TO A GIVEN PROBLEM? HOW DID YOU DISCOVER THE MINIMAL AMOUNT
IF YOU KNOW WHAT IT IS?

3) DID YOU USE ANY STRATEGIES TO SOLVE THE PROBLEMS, OR TO DISCOVER
HOW TO SOLVE THEM? CAN YOU EXPLAIN THE STRATEGIES?
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4) DID YOU TALK TO YOURSELF DURING THE EXPERIMENT?
THINGS DID YOU SAY?

WHAT SORTS OF

5) DID YOU COMPARE CARDS AS YOU DID THE PROBLEMS, OR JUST LOOK AT
EACH CARD AS IT WAS PRESENTED? EXPLAIN?

6) WHAT DO YOU THINK THE PURPOSE OF THE STUDY WAS?

7) GENERAL COMMENTS?

R eproduced with permission o f the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Anderson, L. M. An Examination of Three Types of Feedback to Errors
in a Task Requiring Information Coordination and Inference
(Doctoral dissertation, University of Texas at Austin, 1977).
Dissertation Abstracts International, 1977 , 4_1_, 3034-A.
(University Microfilms No. 77-28, 991)
Annett, J.

Feedback and human behavior.

London: Penguin, 1969.

Barringer, C., & Gholson, B. Effects of Type and Combination of
Feedback upon Conceptual Learning by Children: Implications for
Research in Academic Learning. Review of Educational Research,
1979, 49 (3), 459-478.
Bruner, J. S., Goodnow, J. J., & Austin G. A.
New York: Wiley, 1956.

A study of thinking.

Catania, C. A., Matthews, B. A. & Shimoff, E. Instructed Versus
Shaped Human Verbal Behavior: Interactions with Nonverbal
Responding. Journal of the Experimental Analysis of Behavior,
1982, 38 (3), 233-248.
Day, W. Analyzing Verbal Behavior Under the Control of Private
Events. Behaviorism, 1977, JJ1, 195-200.
Ericsson, K. A., & Simon, H. A. Verbal Reports as Data.
Psychologist, 1980, 87 (3), 215-251.
Farber, I. E. The Things People Say to Themselves.
Psychologist, 1963,
185-197.

The American

The American

Gholson, B., 6 O'Connor, J. Dimensional Control of Hypothesis
Sampling during Three-Choice Discrimination Learning. Child
Development, 1975, 4_6, 894-903.
Greenspoon, J. The Reinforcing Effects of Two Spoken Sounds on the
Frequency of Two Responses. American Journal of Psychology,
1955, 68, 409-416.
Grover, S. C., & Fowler, W. Hypothesis Formation as a Facilitator
of Conceptual Development. Canadian Journal of Behavior Science,
1979, U. (1), 53-63.
Hirsch, J. Learning Without Awareness and Extinction FollowTing
Awareness as a Function of Reinforcement. Journal of Experi
mental Psychology, 1955, ^8, 417-424.
46

with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

47

Kantor, J. R.
1949.

Principles of psychology.

Bloomington, IN:

Kantor, J. R. The aim and progress of psychology.
Principia, 1971.

Principia,

Chicago:

Laughlin, P. R., Lange, R., & Adamopoulos, J. Selection Strategies
of "Mastermind" Problems. Journal of Experimental Psychology:
Learning, Memory, and Cognition, 1982, 8^ (5) , 475-483.
Levine, M. , & Phillips, S. Probing for Hypotheses with Adults
and Children: Blank Trials and Introtacts. Journal of
Experimental Psychology: General, 1975, 104 (4), 327-354.
Mims, R. M. & Gholson, B. Effects of Type and Amount of Feedback
upon Hypothesis Sampling Systems Among 7 - and 8 - year old
children. Journal of Experimental Child Psychology, 1978,
24, 358-371.
Philbrick, E. B., & Postman, L. A Further Analysis of 'Learning
Without Awareness'. American Journal of Psychology, 1955, 68,
417-424.
Piaget, J. Theory of intellectual development:
Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, 1969.
Place, U. T.
I and II.

an introduction.

Skinner's Verbal Behavior III, How to Improve Parts
Behaviorism, 1982, _1_0 (2), 117-136.

Raaijmakers, G. W. A General Framework for the Analysis of Concept
Identification Tasks. Acta Psvchologica, 1981, j49, 233-261.
Rosser, R. A., & Brody, G. H. Acquisition of a Concrete Operational
Rule Through Observational Learning: How Abstract is the Acquired
Abstraction. Merrill-Palmer Quarterly, 1981, 27_ (1), 3-13.
Shannon, C. E., & Weaver, W. The mathematical theory of communication.
Chicago: University of Illinois Press, 1949.
Skinner, B. F.

Science and human behavior. New York:

Skinner, B. F.
1957.

Verbal behavior.

MacMillan, 1953.

Englewood Cliffs, N J : Prentice-Hall,

Skinner, B . F . Contingencies of reinforcement: a theoretical
analysis. Englewood Cliffs, N J : Prentice-Hall, 1969.
Skinner, B. F.

About behaviorism. New York:

Vintage Books, 1976.

Trowbridge, M. H. & Cason, H. An Experimental Study of Thorndike's
Theory of Learning. Journal of General Psychology, 1932, 7_,
245-258.

with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

Verplanck, W. S. Unaware of Where's Awareness: Some Verbal Operants
Notates, Monents, and Notants. In C. W. Erikson (Ed.)» Behavior
and Awareness. Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press, 1962.
Wisocki, P. A. Instructions, Exposure, Rehearsal and Feedback as
elements in Imagery-Based Procedures. Behaviorism, 1977, 18,
189-192.
Yabe, Fumie. Effects of Feedback on Transition of Selection
Strategies in Concept Learning. Japanese Journal of Psychology,
1981, 52 (5), 301-308.
(Abstract)

Reproduced with permission o f the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission

